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In  this  paper  the  role  of  family  structure  in  mitigating  income  volati-
lity in  the  absence  of  income  insurance  in  low-income agricultural  environments
is  discussed.  Hypotheses  concerning the  relationship between  the membership,
size  and  composition  of  households and  insurance-based  income  transfers  are
tested  using  longitudinal  data from  India.  A  test  is  also  performed of  whether
a  household's  ability to reduce risk  ex post  via family arrangements  affects  its
willingness  tobear risk ex  ante  through  its  selection  of  formal  tenancy
contracts.  The results  support  these  hypotheses  concerning  the  risk-mitigating
roles  of  both household structure  and  share  contracts,  and  indicate  as  well  the
importance  of  heterogeneity  in  risk-aversion  across  households.In  recent  years our  understanding of  rural  institutions  in  low-income set-
tings  has  been  increased  substantially by the  application  of modern micro-
analytic models  and methods  to  such  environments. Two  strands  of  literature have
emerged.  One  has  focused on  the  econometric modeling  of  household  "insti-
tutions"  as  the  loci  of economic  activities,  in  the  theoretical  tradition of
Chayanov  (1925).  This  literature  (e.g.,  Lau,  Lin  and  Yotopoulos  (1978),  Barnum
and Squire  (1978)  and Rosenzweig (1980),  summarized in  Singh et  al.  (1986)),  has
employed  static,  utility-maximizing models  of  households simultaneously engaged
in  production  and consumption  decisions  to  provide rigorous  (i.e.,
theoretically-grounded)  and  informative econometric  analyses  of  the  interplay
between  food prices,  wage rates,  agicultural  profits,  food  consumption  and  labor
supply.
A  second, contemporaneous  literature highlights  two other  important  aspects
of  low-income rural  environments, their  riskiness and  the  absence of,  or  limita-
tions  on,  insurance  and  other  intertemporal  markets.  These environmental
characteristics  and  the  assumption  of  risk-averse agents  are  shown  to  account
for  the existence  of  such  important  formal  rural  institutions  as  share  tenancy
and  permanent servant contracts  as  well  as  contractual  interlinking.  All  of
these  institutions  are  viewed  at  least  in  part  as  ex  ante  means  of  reducing  the
riskiness  of  agricultural  production  for  rural  agents.
These  two parallel  approaches  are  characterized by complementary short-
comings.  The  household enterprise  literature  ignores market  problems,  indeed
explicitly assuming the existence  of  all  markets  and  full  information,  and  thus
is  silent on  intertemporal  aspects  of  consumption  and  production  under risk.
Moreover,  the  approach  takes for  granted rather  than explains  the  structure of
households--their  size  and membership.  The  studies concerned with  contractual
forms,  on  the  other  hand,  have  seen  little  empirical  application  or  testing,  in2
part  because of  the  difficulty of  extracting  interesting testable  implications,
and  in  part  due  to  data limitations.  Moreover,  almost  all  of  these models  are
of  single-person  agents engaged  in  only one contractual  arrangement  despite  the
fact that  almost  all  households  in  the  settings  to which  the models  apply con-
tain multiple workers  who  are  often engaged  in  different activities  under
multiple contract arrangements.  And  such models  assume  that  households  have
no  means  of  smoothing  ex  post  income  fluctuations.
In  recent  years  it  has  been  argued  that  the  "transaction  costs"  framework
(Williamson (1979)) which  seeks  to  explain  the existence of particular  institu-
tional  forms  can  be  fruitfully applied  to  the  family as  an  organization, par-
ticularly in  low-income settings  when such  costs  may render  informal
arrangements  more  efficient  than  formal  markets  (Ben-Porath  (1980),  Pollak
(1985)).  This  approach  to the  family has  seen  little or  no empirical  verifica-
tion,  however,  as  the environment  in  which the  household or  family arrangements
substitute  for  formal market arrangements  has  not  been  adequately specified.
Precise  implications  are  thus  lacking  for  how households smooth  their consump-
tion  in  the face  of residual  income variability, that which  is  not eliminated by
formal  risk-mitigating  contractual  arrangements.  In  part,  the  theoretical
neglect of  household behavior  with respect  to  risk  and  the  dearth  of  empirical
work on  contractual  arrangements  also stems  from  the  absence  of  longitudinal
data  on  households,  which would document  the  importance  of  income fluctuations.
Indeed, this  salient attribute  of  agriculture,  income volatility,  is  completely
hidden  in  the  cross-section household data which have made  an  important contri-
bution  the  to  recent advances  in  our  understanding of  rural  institutions.
This  paper  is  concerned with exploring the  role of  the household  as  a
risk-mitigating  institution  in low-income rural  settings, with  particular  atten-
tion  to  the relationship between  the  structure of households  and ex  ante  and ex
post  income  (consumption) smoothing.  In  Section 1,  some  perspectives  on  the3
household  are  set  out, with experientally-obtained  information on  risk  patterns
and  spatially-spread  intrafamily transfers highlighted.  In  Section  2,  longitu-
dinal  data  from  six  villages  in  the  semi-arid  tropics  of  India  are  described  and
fluctuations  in  agricultural  incomes  and  in  household  transfer  income  over  nine
years  are documented.  Section 3 contains  an  econometric  analysis  of  the rela-
tionships  among  family  and household  arrangements,  income  fluctuations  and
intrahousehold  transfers.  The  results  indicate  that  income  transfers  play a
role  in  smoothing consumption.  Moreover,  the  degree  to  which  households  succeed
in  mitigating  risk  ex  post  via  transfers  depends  importantly  on  household  struc-
ture.  In  Section 4,  the  proposition  is  tested  that  the  household's ability to
smooth  consumption  ex  post,  through household arrangements,  is  manifested in  its
formal  contractual  arrangements  aimed  at  reducing exposure  to  income  risk ex
ante.  The  econometric prolems  inherent  in  testing propositions  about  institu-
tions  serving risk-mitigating  functions  when  there  is  heterogeneity  among  agents
in  risk-aversion  is  discussed  and  a  test  of  the  risk-reducing  motive  for
sharecropping  is  implemented.  Section 5  contains a  summary and  discussion  of
how  viewing  the  household as  a  risk-reducing  institution  has  implications  for
the means  by which economic  development may transform the  structure and  stabi-
lity  of  households.
1.  The  Technology of Agricultural  Production  and  Family Structure
There  are  six  important  environmental  and  technological  characteristics of
many rural  areas of  low-income  countries  that must  be  incorporated in  any  useful
analysis  of  institutions  in such  settings:  A.  An  important production  input
(weather)  is stochastic,  its  realizations  during the  course  of  production  being
unpredictable and exogenous.  B.  The  intertemporal  distribution  of  weather
outcomes  is characterized  by stationarity.  C.  Weather  outcomes  are  serially
(positively) correlated  across  space.  D.  Another  important production  input,4
land,  is  immobile.  E.  The  technology of  production  is  stable.  F.  Production
(crop)  insurance  is  absent.
As  long  as  agents  in  rural  areas  prefer  to  smooth  their  consumption
over  time  and/or  are  (relatedly)  risk-averse,  condition  A implies  that
resources  will  in  part  be  allocated  to minimize the riskiness  of  income  and/or
to  smooth  consumption.  Condition F implies  that  individuals  will  look  for
alternatives to  direct  income  insurance.  Note  that  the  absence  of  crop
insurance  itself  must  be  explained  in  any  analysis  of  rural  institutions.  In
Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig (1986),  it  is  shown how  information  and moral  hazard
problems  inherent  to  agricultural  production  combined with  condition C  make  the
provision  of  crop  insurance  by private, profit-seeking  agents  unlikely  (see
below).  Finally,  conditions  B  and  E  imply  that  the  institutions  that  are  devel-
oped to  cope with risk  and fluctuating  incomes will  be  stable, will  be  per-
sistent features  in  the rural  environment.
The modern  contractual  arrangements  literature has  focused  on  how produc-
tion  risk, combined with the  absence of  crop  insurance,  spills  over  into  the .
land  rental  and  wage  labor  markets, manifesting itself  in  share tenancy and  per-
manent servant contracts  with their  attendant social  (in  terms  of  static effi-
ciency criteria) and  personal  costs  (Bardhan,  1984).  Such rural  institutions
reduce fluctuations  in  income  for  given  intertemporal  patterns  of  states  of
nature.  However,  it  is  likely that  the  structure  of  rural  households  is  also
conditioned by risk  and  consumption  smoothing problems.  Indeed,  the  structure
of  households  in  the  low-income settings  described above appears  to  differ
distinctly from that  of  high-income  industrialized countries  characterized by
more organized markets,  governmental  social  insurance  schemes, more predictable
income sources,  and  technological  change, where the  dominant  household form is
the  nuclear  family.6
family.  The  model  thus simultaneously accounts for  why  land  sales  (and mobility
among  landholders)  are  low even  in  settings  in  which property rights  are well-
defined  and  the  particular  intergenerational  structure  of  the  households  in  the
AF  setttings,  given  the  gender-based division  of  labor.  Note that  in  this
framework  the  experience  of  siblings,  given  the  proximity  of  their  age,  is
(almost) redundant;  there  are no  "rents"  associated with  sibling co-residence.
Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  used a  national  longitudinal  probability sample of
Indian  farm households  to  test  the  proposition  that more experienced farmers
suffered  less  in  terms  of  farm profitability  under  adverse weather  conditions.
Their results  were consistent with this  hypothesis.  They  also showed  that (i)
sales  of  land were  significantly  less  likely when  the family was  intergenera-
tionally extended, for  given  weather conditions, mean  farm profitability and  the
schooling attainment  of  the  head, and  (ii)  the  intergenerational  family struc-
ture was more  prevalent  in  areas  subject  to  greater  weather-induced  profit
fluctuations.
b. Spatial  Covariances  in  Weather  and Household Transfer-Insurance
Arrangements
The  Rosenzweig-Wolpin  specific experience model  suggests  that  the  problem
of  stochastic weather  variability combined with  land specificities  binds  the
intergenerationally-extended  family  to  their  family  plot.  Ex  ante  consumption
smoothing represents  a  centripetal force  bonding  (certain) family members
together.  The  concentration of  family members  in  one  location  (even  if  plots of
land  are diversified and  fragmented), however,  makes  it  difficult for  the  house-
hold  to smooth  consumption either  ex  post or  ex  ante,  given  environmental
characteristics C and  0.  Diversifying the household's  portfolio of  income
sources would require  less spatial  concentration,  given  the  spatial  covariance
of  weather patterns  and  the  immobility of  land.  The  desire for  consumption7
smoothing thus  represents a  centrifugal  force  spreading out  the  family's members
across space  in  the  AF  environment.
The  diversification  of  family  income  sources  combined  with  intrafamily  (and
interhousehold)  income  sharing  is  a  means  of  smoothing  consumption  given  imper-
fect  covariances  between  kin-related  households'  stochastic  realizations  of
income.  The  positive association  be-tween  risk-spreading and  locational  diver-
sity,  however,  is  precisely the reason  for  the  failure of a  crop  insurance
market--the  information costs  associated with monitoring exogenous shortfalls  in
incomes  across  many  locations  are  pro-hibitively  high.  Thus  it  is  not
surprising  that  anonymous  agents  spread far  apart  cannot undertake  implicit
insurance  agreements.  If  kinship  and  common  (family) experiences  induce  trust,
knowledge  and  altruism among family members, such  income-pooling  implicit
insurance contracts may  be feasible even  if  spread across wide  areas.  The  spa-
tially diversified,  income-pooling family represents  another  institution  arising
from or  influenced  by the  hazardous  nature of  rural  production  and  the  dif-
ficulties  of  self-insurance  in  low-income,  rural  settings.
The  stationarity conditions B  and E  are  very  important  for  the feasibility
of  these  long-term,  implicit  family  insurance  contracts.  If  the  distribution of
states  of  nature  is  unknown,  or  if  the  technology of  production  is  changing
unpredictabably, the  information accumulated  by family membes  is  obsolesced  and
and  an  important  precondition  for  insurance  contracts  is  absent--knowledge of
the risks  (expected liabilities).  Technical  change thus  is  likely  to  alter
both  the  stability and  the  structure  of  households,  even  if  such  change neither
exacerbates  nor mitigates  directly  income risk.  In  contrast, risk-neutral  tech-
nical  change may not significantly alter  directly the  demand for  more formal
contractual forms  such  as  share tenancy, which rely  less  on  trust,  altruism or
knowledge of  risk.8
Are spatially-spread,  family  income-pooling arrangements  important  in  low-
income environments?  Caldwell  et  al.  (1986) report  that  in  their  study of
households  in  nine  villages  in  Karnataka  in  South  India provision for  income
shortfalls  was a "dominant"  consideration  in  family  life.  Moreover,  they found
that  a principal  reason  that  household consumption  did  not  fall  severely during
drought conditions  (inclusive  of  complete  crop  failures)  in  their  study area was
the  ability of  the  households  to  obtain resources  from relatives.  Moreover,
they found  that 87  percent  of  the relatives  providing aid were  located outside
the  study villages.  Caldwell  et  al.  also found  that  an  important source of
these compensatory  transfers was  the family  of  the  head's wife.  This  latter
finding  implies  that  the  bringing  in  of  a  new  family  member  from  another
environment via marriage  adds  to  the family's  ability to  smooth  consumption;
exogamy may reflect  the  spatial  nature  of  risk patterns.
Lucas  and  Stark  (1985)  also showed  that rural  households  in  Botswana who
were residing  in  areas  subject  to drought received more remittances  from migrant
family members,  for  given  wealth, compared  to households  in  non-drought areas..
However, a problem with both  the  Caldwell  and Lucas  and Stark  studies  is  that,
because  they  are  based  on  data  from  one  point  in  time,  they  do  not  really
demonstrate  that  net transfers fluctuate  (inversely) with  the  origin  households'
economic conditions.  In  a true  (fair)  insurance  contract, resources must  flow
out of  such  households  in  good  times.  It is impossible  to  know from these
cross-sectional  studies whether  the poorer  households were receiving  higher
transfers  temporarily or  were, for  other  reasons, net recipients  of  aid.
2.  Variability  in  Agricultural  Profits,  Wage Rates  and Transfer  Income  in  Six
Indian Villages
To document the  hazards  of  agricultural  production  and  the  importance of
household transfers  in  smoothing consumption  poses  severe data requirements,  as
longitudinal  information  over  an  extensive period on  income  by source,  on  costs9
of  production  and  on  family structure  are needed.  In  1975/76  the  International
Crops  Research  Institute  for  the  Semi-Arid Tropics  (ICRISAT)  began  a survey  in
six  villages  in  each  of  three  agroclimatic  regions  in  the semi-arid  tropics of
India.  Information  on  income,  expenditures, production  resources,  assets  and
family membership was  collected  at  intervals  of  3-4 weeks  for  40  households  per
village  in  each  of  10 years  for  three  of  the  villages  (one  in  each  region),  and
for  7  years  (the  first 5 and  the  last  2)  for  the  three  others.  In  1984 a
retrospective questionnaire,  designed  by Hans  Binswanger  and Mark  Rosenzweig,
was  employed  to obtain  information  on  additional  family details,  including
inheritances  and marriage  information,  and  on  incomes  for  the missing  three
years  for  the  three villages  for  which  this  information was  absent.  At  the  time
of  the  writing  of  this  paper,  data  for  nine  consecutive  cropping  years  (1974/75
through 1983/84)  for  201  households  in  the  six  villages were  available for
analysis.
Two  of  the  villages, Aurepalle  and Dokur,  are  in a  region characterized  by
soils with  limited water  storage capacity and  by  low  levels  and  erratically
distributed  intra-and across-year rainfall.  Irrigation  is  also not extensive.
Two  other  villages,  Shirapur  and  Kalman,  are  in  an  area  with  soils  having
superior  water  storage  capacities,  but  with  irregular  rainfall  and  little  irri-
gation.  The  final  two  villages,  Kanzara  and  Kinkheda,  have  soils  with  medium
storage capacity but experience  significantly more reliable,  but  low,  levels of
rainfall  compared  to  the other  regions.
Figure  1  plots  real  mean  agricultural  profits  (gross  income  from crop pro-
duction  less  all  costs  inclusive of  family labor,  in  1975 rupees)  by village  for
the  201  households  in  existence for  all  nine  crop years.  The  three  line  pat-
terns  conform to  the  three  regions,  being  identical  within each  region to  faci-
litate  comparisons  of  intra-  and  across-region heterogeneity.  As  can  be  seen,
profits  fluctuated  considerably  in  all  villages  over  the  period--indeed,  theID
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sample mean  coefficient  of  variation is  139.  Correlations  across  regions
moreover,  are  small,  and  in  all  but  the  third  region  (Kanzara  and  Kinkheda),
within-region correlations  in  profits  across years  are  also relatively  low,  but
higher  than  those  across  regions--the regional  correlations  are -.060,  .15  and
.24;  the  cross-village, within-region correlations  for  the Aurepalle-Dokur,
Shirapur-Kalman,  and  Kanzara-Kinkheda pairs  are  .32,  .43,  and  .84 respectively.
The  less-than-perfect positive  correlations  across  regions  and  villages  in  pro-
fit  variability suggests  that  there  is  potential  for  consumption  smoothing via
cross-region  and  cross-village  income  sharing.
Figure  2 displays  plots  of  real  daily agricultural  wages for  males for  each
of  the  six  villages  across  the  nine years.  Here,  within-region similarity in
intertemporal  wage  patterns  is  high  (the  correlations  are  .48,  .98 and  .49)
and  wage  levels  are  more  similar  across  villages  than  are  levels  of  mean  agri-
cultural  profits,  as  might  be expected  given  the relative  degrees  of mobility of
land  and  labor.  However, wage  volatility  is  also  pronounced and  wage fluc-
tuations  are  not  perfectly correlated across  regions.  Thus,  there  is  con-
siderable  instability in  the returns  to  labor  as  well  as  in  the residual  returns
to  crop  production,  and  the  co-movements  in  these returns  suggest scope  for
transfer-based  insurance  arrangements.
Table  1  reports  descriptive  statistics  for  186  of  the  sample  households  in
the  six  villages  for  which  all  family  structure  and  income  information  is
available.  Mean  gross  transfer  income  (defined  net of  dowry payments  in  or  out)
over  the nine years was  about  10 percent  of mean  agricultural  profits,  with mean
net  transfer  income  (gross  transfer  income  less  transfer  expenditures excluding
dowry receipts  and payments)  almost nil--there  is  thus  an  overall  balance of
gross  inflows  and outflows  over  the  period,  to  be expected  in  a stationary
environment  if  transfers have  a strong insurance  component.  Are the  sources  of
transfers  mostly  within  or  outside  the  village  economies?  Do  net transfersID
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)J  ·Table  1
Characteristics  of  Households  in  Six  ICRISAT  Villages:  1975-83
Standard
Characteristic  Mean  Deviation
a
Real gross transfer  income  213  1000
a Real net  transfer  income  -18.0  1509
Real  profits from crop production  2221  3660
Nine-year  coefficient  of  variation,  real  profits  136  454
Value  of  owned  landa   26161  43000
Village  daily  wage,  malesa  3.70  0.68
Surviving  siblings  of  head  3.32  2.05
Number  of  co-resident  daughters-in-law  of  head  0.39  0.80
Number  of  household  migrants  0.22  0.97
Number  of  co-resident  adult  males  1.87  1.15
Number  of  co-resident  adult  females  1.83  1.06
Age of head  47.9  12.3
Percent  of  operated  acres  shared-in,  cultivating  7.37  -
households
Number  of  households  186
a.  1975  rupees.11
fluctuate  and  respond  in  a  compensating  manner  to  profit  fluctuations?  Figure  3
displays  graphically  by  year  the  deviations  from  village-specific  means  for  net
transfer  income  and  for  farm  profits  in  the  six  villages.  If  transfers  were
solely  intravillage,  deviations  from  (village)  means  would  be  zero  in  each  year.
They  are  not;  moreover,  across  the  whole  sample,  net  transfer  income  tends  on
average  to  be  high  (relative  to  its  village  mean)  when  profits  are  relatively
low,  and  vice  versa,  suggesting  that  such  transfers  do  contribute  on  net  to
inhibiting  consumption  variability  due  to  income  fluctuations.
3.  Estimates  of  the  Net  Transfer  Rate  and  Its  Relationship  to  Family  Structure
and  Endowments
a.  Specification  and  Estimation  Procedure
To  more  rigorously  test  the  hypothesis  that  net  transfers  are  compensatory
with  respect  to  income  shortfalls  and  to  examine  the  role  of  family  structure
in  facilitating  such  transfers,  we  estimate  the  following  model  using  the
ICRISAT  household  data:
n  n
(1)  =  0  +  Btj  +  B2j  +  YFijtJ  +  .F..  +  P  +  tj
where  Ttj  is  net  transfer  income  in  the  tth  year  for  the  jth  household,
tj  =  tj  - rtjis  the  jth  household's  profit  deviation  in  year  t  from  its  mean
profit  7.  and  the  Fij  are  the  set  of  n characteristics  of  the  household  that
j  ij
influence  the  rate  at  which  net  transfer  income  responds  to  profit  deviations,
the  "transfer  rate."  We  define  the  transfer  rate  for  the  jth  household,  R.  as
the  absolute  value  of  the  derivative  of  (1)  with  respect  to  rtj;
n
(2)  Rj  =  abs[81  +  z YiF..,l
i=l   i
whereY  i  <  0  for  any  household  attribute  facilitating  transfers;  that  is,  net
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insurance  arrangement  and  the  transfer rate  should be  greater  for  households
with  higher  levels  of  Fij.
Our  discussion in  Section 2 suggested that  the  composition  of  the  family and
the  co-residential  household will  influence  the  transfer rate.  In  particular,
those  family  members  able  to  participate  in  the  mutual  insurance  contract  should
be  included among the  Fij.  These would include  relatives  of  the  head (or
spouse) resident  outside  the  household and  co-resident members  with  attachments
to  (family)  resources  external  to  the  household.  Accordingly,  we  include  among
the  Fi  (i)  the  number  of  siblings  of  the  household head, who are  not co-
residing with  the  head,2  (ii)  the  number  of  "migrant" household members,  defined
in  the  survey as  household members  with  no  other  established household,  and
(iii)  the number  of  daughters-in-law of  the  head.  The "migrants" are  prin-
cipally sons  of  the head  serving  in  the military, but  include  as  well  daughters
in  "domestic" service.  The  majority of migrants reside  outside  of  the  district
in  which  their  home  village is  located.  Note  that military (and  domestic)  ser-
vice  implies  an  assured  income  that is  not covariant with  agricultural  income.
As  noted, co-resident daughters-in-law of  the  household head  are members  as  well
of  families  residing outside  the  household's village.  The number  of  daughters-
in-law thus  represent the  number  of  potential  arrangements with external  resour-
ces,  tied  via  matrimony.
In  addition  to  the  family and  household membership variables,  the  house-
hold's endowments may be  important in  influencing the  household's  transfer rate.
If greater resources enable  the  household to  self-insure through  savings  or  are
associated with  less  aversion  to risk,  well-endowed households may be  less
willing  to  invest  in  family-based transfer cum  insurance  arrangements  (although
better  able  to  finance  them).  The  age  of  the head may also  influence  R.,to the
extent that transfer  arrangements  require  time  to establish.  Such schemes,  for13
example,  require  information  about the  distribution  of  risks,  which  is  only
revealed  over  time.
Omitted  from  (1)  are  the  circumstances  of  those  agents  external  to  the
household who  are  potential  participants  in  the  implicit  insurance  arrangements.
Theory suggests,  of  course,  that  the  arrangements  are  symmetric--the direction
and magnitude of  net  transfers  in  period t  depends  on  the relative  transitory
outcomes  characterizing  all  parties  in  the  "contract"  in  t.  To the extent,
however,  that  incomes  are  not highly correlated--a  desired attribute  of  such
arrangements, this  omission  should not  result  in  any significant  bias  in  the
household transfer  coefficients  (in  any case,  positive correlations  in  tran-
sitory incomes  imply a  positive  bias,  against  the  theory).  For  example,  the
earnings  of migrants  in  military service should be  uncorrelated with  the  house-
hold's farm profits.  The  absence  of  information  on  the  incomes  of  all  contrac-
tual  parties  associated with each  household in  the  sampling frame  is  common  to
almost  all  surveys. 4  Future work on  contracts, either  implicit  or  explicit, may
require  new thinking  about optimal  sampling procedures.
A  serious  econometric problem, for  which corrective  action  can  be  taken,
arises  because  of  potential  heterogeneity  among households  in  abilities  or  in
preferences  for  risk-taking.  Since  profit  levels  will  reflect  the  unmeasured
abilities  and  skills  of  the  household head  (a  common  problem  in  estimating pro-
duction  functions),  and  contracted  transfers may also  reflect  abilities, estima-
tes  of  (1)  by least-squares  will  yield biased coefficients.  More  importantly,
the head's  willingness  to  bear risk may influence  the  extent to  which he  engages
in ex  ante measures to minimize profit  variability as  well  as  in ex  post  con-
sumption  smoothing arrangements  (such  as  investing  in  migration)--transfers,
family  membership and ex  post profit  variability will  jointly reflect unob-
served risk preferences.14
To eliminate  the  biases  associated with these  unmeasured attributes  of  the
household, we can  exploit  the  longitudinal  nature of  the  ICRISAT village  data.
If  the  unmeasured risk preference  and  ability characteristics  are time-
invariant,  as  depicted by the Pj  term in  equation  (1),  then a  fixed effect pro-
cedure will  yield unbiased estimates  of  all  of  the  transfer rate  coefficients
in  (2);  i.e.,  B1  and  the  Yi'  without  the  necessity  of  imposing  any  distribu-
tional  assumptions  on  the  omitted  time-persistent characteristics  (although we
must  assume  the  error  term  is  additive).  A cost of  this  procedure  is  that  the
influence of  measured  time-invariant  variables  (such  as  mean  profits)  on  net
transfer  levels  will  not  be  estimable,  but  these  are  of  secondary  interest  here.
b.  Results
Table 2  reports  the results  obtained for  two  specifications  of  equation  (1).
The  first  two columns  are  GLS  (random coefficients)  and fixed effect estimates,
respectively, of  equation  (1)  that  exclude  the  family-member  interaction  terms.
The  first set  of  estimates  thus  do  not  take  into  account  the  possible correlation
of  the right-hand side  variables with  the error  terms,  although  the  procedure
does  allow household-specific  persistence  in  errors  as  well  as  for  time-
invariant village-level  effects  (captured  by the five  dummy variable  coef-
ficients with village  names).  The  specification also  ignores  the  role  of  the
family  in  facilitating  transfers.  The  second specification also omits  family
considerations,  but  the  estimates  are free  of  any biases  due  to  omitted, time-
invariant errors.  Both  sets  of  estimates,  however,  indicate  that  net  transfers
respond  inversely, on  average,  to  farm profit  deviations  and  to  village-level
agricultural  wage rates.  The fixed effect estimates are not  very precise, as  is
common  with this  procedure if  there  is  measurement error  in  the  variables  (the
profit-deviation and wage coefficients are  jointly significant  at  the  .05  level
in that  equation, however).  On  average,  transfers  reduce  the  variability  inTable  2
Determinants  of  Household  Net  Transfer  Income:
GLS and  Fixed  Effect  Estimates
Specification  and  Estimation  Procedure
(1)  (2)
GLS  Fixed  Effect  Fixed  Effect
Profits from crop production
Village  daily  wage  rate
Mean profits
Siblings  x  profits
Migrants x profits
Daughters-in-law  x  profits
Inheritance  x  profits
(X10 - 6)
Head's  age  x  profits
Head's age
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profits  by less  than  one percent, but  the  rate  increases significantly  for  those
households  with  more  family  "ties"  (see  below).
The GLS  estimates  also  indicate that  households  with higher mean  levels of
profits  are net  providers  of  transfers,  suggesting that  there  is  some  private
and  (but  persistent)redistribution of resources  across  households.  However,
Hausman  tests reveal  that  the  set  of  variables  in  specification  (1)  are  signifi-
cantly correlated with  the residuals;  thus  the  estimates  in  column  one  are
biased.
The  third  column  of  Table 2 reports  the  (appropriate) fixed effect estimates
of  equation  (1)  inclusive of  interaction  (yi) terms.  The  set  of  family/profit
deviation  interaction estimates are  consistent  with  the hypothesis  that  the
transfer  rate, the  degree to  which  transfers  compensate for  profit  shortfalls
(and require  outflows  in  "good"  times),  depends on  the  "structure"  of  the  house-
hold.  In  particular,  households  whose  head  has  a  greater  number  of  siblings
(who reside  outside  the  household),  that  have more migrant members  and  have
more  daughters-in-law  are  characterized  by  greater  transfer  rates,  controlling
for  all  fixed  attributes  of  the  households. 5   In  contrast to  the  Caldwell et
al.  finding  that  daughters-in-law  are  the most  important means  through  which
insurance  transfers  come,  Table  2  indicates  that  it  is  the  siblings  of  the
head who provide  (receive) the most support  in  response  to  income flucations.
The  point estimates  suggest  that a  household with  a  50-year  old head having 4
siblings, 2  married  daughters  and  one migrant would have a  transfer  rate of 2.5
percent  (the  maximum rate in  the  sample is 5.3 percent).
The  results  in  column  three also suggest  that  households whose  heads  are
older  are  also characterized by greater  compensatory transfers.  Moreover, as
expected, those  households  with greater  endowments,  as represented by the  value
of  the  head's  inheritance,  have a lower  transfer rate;  insurance-based,  house-
hold  transfers  decline  with  household  resources.16
4.  The Relationship  Between  Ex  Ante  and Ex  Post  Insurance  Arrangements:
Family  Structure,  the  Transfer  Rate,  and  Sharecropping
An  important  implication  of  the  insurance-theoretic approach  to  institutions
is  that  one risk-reducing  institution  should substitute  for  another.  Thus,
for  example,  households  better  able  to  engage in  ex  post  consumption  smoothing
would presumably allocate  less  resources,  ceteris  paribus,  to  ex  ante  insurance
arrangements,  and  vice  versa.  In  this  section  we  further  test  the  hypothesis
that  family structure mitigates  consumption  volatility via  transfers by
testing whether households  more  successful  in  their  ex  post  transfer
contracting  are  less  willing  to share  risk  ex  ante  via  share  tenancy.  Note
that  we  are  also  testing a  central  propositon  of  the  sharecropping literature,
that  share  contracts  serve  an  important  risk-mitigating role.6  Our  discussion
suggests  that  family structure and  share  contracting are  importantly  linked.
Heterogeneity among  contractual  agents  in  attitudes  towards  risk renders
tests of  institutional  or  contractual  "substitution"  difficult.  Theory suggests
(or  defines)  that  if  an  agent of  given  characteristics  finds it  cheaper to
insure via  one  contract,  he  will  substitute  resources from other,  substitute
contracts.  A  comparison  of  contractual  choices  among heterogeneous  agents,
however,  confounds  this  (attitudes-constant) substitution with  the  variability
across  agents  in  willingness  to  bear  risk.  Thus, more risk-averse agents  may
choose  to  intensively  insure ex  ante  as  well  as  ex  post;  less  risk-adverse
agents  may do  little of  either.  Heterogeneity  thus  biases  positively the
hypothesized negative association  between  substitute  contractual  institutions.
To assess  the  importance of heterogeneity in risk  attitudes,  both  the  GLS
and  fixed effects procedures  are  employed to  estimate,  among  the  153  culti-
vating  households  in the  ICRISAT sample,  the  relationships between family
structure,  the  transfer rate  and  the  proportion  of  cultivated acres  that  are
shared  in. Table 3  reports  estimates  of  these  relationships.  In  the firstTable  3
Determinants  of  Proportion
Cultivating  Households:
of  Operated  Acres  Sharecropped  by
GLS  and  fixed  Effect  Estimates
Two-Stage
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column,  the  GLS  estimates  indicate  that  sharecropping  intensity  is  negatively
related  to  the  presence of  family members  (co-resident or  not)  shown  in  Table
2 to facilitate ex  post  consumption  smoothing,  for  given  family size.  While
only  the  migrant  variable  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  by  conven-
tional  standards,  the  three family  variables  are  jointly significant at  the
.01  level.  The  GLS  estimates  also  indicate,  as  is  conventionally found, that
households  owning  greater  land resources engage  less  in  sharecropping, for
given  family size;  a  result consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that risk  aversion
decreases  with  wealth.
One  convenient  way to  summarize the  influence  of  the  family, endowment and
age variables  on  sharecropping arrangements  is  to  use  the  estimated transfer
rate  coefficients  (equation  (2))  from Table 2  to  construct household-specific
(and  time-varying) transfer  rates.  Since these rates are measured with error,
the relevant  family and  endowment variables  can  be  used  as  instruments  in  a
two-stage procedure.  The second column  of  Table 2  reports the  sharecropping-
transfer rate estimate, which  confirms  the  findings  of column  1--those house-
holds with  greater  ex  post  insurance  purchase significantly less  ex  ante  risk
protection  via sharecropping.
Column 3  reports  the  corresponding fixed effect estimate.  While  the
transfer  rate  coefficient  is  slightly  less  precisely  measured  than  its  GLS
counterpart,  it  is  notable  that  its  magnitude (in  absolute  value  terms)
increases  by 270 percent.  The presence  of  heterogeneity in  risk  preferences
evidently substantially biases,  in  a predictable  direction,  the estimated
substitution between  the  two  insurance-based contracts.  The  (consistent) fixed
effect  point estimate  indicates  that  households that  send out  one member  as  a
migrant, with  no change  in  household membership size,  would reduce their  propor-
tion  of  acreage cultivated under  share  tenancy  by 32 percent;  the marriage of  a18
co-resident son  (the  addition  of  a  daughter-in-law)  decreases  share tenancy
intensity by  33  percent.
5.  Conclusion
In  low-income countries,  the  family is  a  critical  institution which serves
many of  the roles  carried out  by formal  organizations  in  high-income societies.
Aside from  the family's  preeminent role  in  determining population  growth  and
human  capital  investment,  two  key development  factors,  the  ties  of  common
experience,  altruism and heritage  among family members mitigate  the  inefficien-
cies  associated  with  the absence  of  impersonal  markets,  a  salient charac-
teristic of  low-income environments.  In  this  paper  we have highlighted  the
problem of  income volatility  and the  absence  of  income  insurance  in  low-income
environments and  have  discussed how the membership, size  and composition of
households  and  cross-household kinship  ties  can  be  at  least partly understood  in
terms  of risk-mitigation.  Evidence from a  set  of villages  in  India suggested
that  kinship  in  a  risky world not  only tends  to  bond family members  in  a  single
location  (in  a  particular  way) but  kinship  ties  are  able  to  be  sustained over.
space and  over  time  in  implicit  insurance-based transfer  schemes.  While  such
arrangements evidently play only a  small  role  in  enabling a  household to  smooth
its  intertemporal  consumption  paths,  a  household's success  in  reducing risk ex
post via  its  family ties  importantly affects  its  willingness to  bear risk ex
ante  through  the  organization  of  productive  resources.
The  ability of  the  family as  a  collective  institution  to  protect  its  indivi-
dual  members  from severe risks  and  to efficiently utilize empirically-
ascertained  knowledge  in  productive activities  appears  to  rest  importantly on
the  stationarity of  the  low-income-setting.  Technical  change within  the  rural
sector,  which alters  the distribution of  risks,  thus may erode the  comparative
advantage of the  elderly--their  knowledge of  optimal  productive practices under
differential  varieties  of  states  of  nature--and  make  difficult  long-term  impli-19
cit  contracts  among  individuals  based on  assumptions  about  the future.  Thus,
resources may be  transferred from  the  old to  the  young in  the form  of  loss  of
"respect" for elders  or  the  break-up  of  intergenerationally-extended families.
Agricultural  technical  change  may  thus  lead  to  new  family  structures,  to  changes
in  marital  customs,  to  increased mobility, to  increased ex  ante risk protection
measures,  and  to more conservative attitudes  and  to  resistance  to change,  at
least  in  the  short term,  even  if  such  advances  lower  overall  risk  levels.
In  contrast  to  the  effects  of  agricultural  technical  change,  urban  industri-
alization may facilitate risk-taking within  the  agricultural  sector  and  increase
the  spatial  extension  of  families  or  households.  The  increased availability of
income  sources whose risks  are  not  highly covariant with  those  in  agriculture
may create  incentives  for  households  to  invest  in  the migration  of  its members.
If  income  pooling with migrants  can  be  sustained, reductions  in  ex  ante
production-related risk-avoidance measures may ensue.
Finally,  the emergence, establishment or  improvement  of  formal  institutions
which  more  efficiently  perform  some  of  the  functions  taken  on  by  families  will
also tend  to  transform the  structure  of  households  and  affect family rela-
tionships.  Designers  of  such  institutions should  be cognizant  of  their  impact
on  the  household organization, which so  directly  affects the  welfare of  indivi-
duals.  Improved models  of  family interactions  may be  helpful  in  anticipating
the welfare  effects  of  both  economic development generally  and  the  development
of  specific  institutions  designed to  facilitate growth.20
Footnotes
1.  Becker  (1981)  in  his concise,  but  speculative,  discussion  of  families  in
"traditional"  societies  also  highlights  the  riskiness  and  stationarity  pro-
perties  of  such  environments  in  accounting  for  household functions.
However,  the  problems  associated  with  the  spatial  nature  of  agricultural
risk  patterns  are  given  less  attention.  Ben-Porath  (1980)  ignores  sta-
tionarity  but  suggests  the  importance of risk-covariances  in  the ability
of  the family  to  cope with  income risks.
2.  Consistent with  the specific experience framework,  in  only 4 of  the  201
households  did a sibling  of  the head reside  in  the  same household as  the
head.
3.  Married daughters  of  the  household head, who reside outside the
household, also  represent external,  kinship  ties  and  were  included in  preli-
minary  empirical  investigations.  However,  the  number  of married daughters
did  not  affect  the extent  to which  net transfers  responded to  the  (origin)
household's  income fluctuations.  It is  likely that the  origin household's
transfers would  be  affected by the  transitory  incomes  of  the  household in
which  the married daughter resides,  but  information  on  this  variable  is
absent  from  the  survey  data  (see  below).
4.  Neither  the  Caldwell  et  al.  (1986)  nor  the  Lucas  and  Stark  (1985)  studies
incorporated  the  incomes  of  the  transfer-source  households.
5.  Note that  the  finding that  co-resident daughters-in-law  are  associated with
greater  (origin)  income-responsive transfers  (net of  dowry) while  married
daughters  are  not  (see  Note 2) implies  that  transfers,  on  net,  flow from  the
household of  origin  to  the  new household of the  daughter  in  response  to  the
daughter's  transitory welfare  level  and that  the  covariation  between head's21
and daughter's  household  incomes  is  not  high.  Parental  altruism  dominates
in-law altruism.
6.  Other  non-risk-based explanations of  sharecropping emphasize  the  absence of
markets  for  and  the  unequal  distribution  of  farming  experience  (e.g.,
Eswaran  and Kotwal  (1985))  and  the  incentives  problems  associated with asset
maintenance  (Datta  and  Nugent  (1986)).22
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